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Abstract
In many supply chains, the variance of orders may be considerably larger than that of sales, and
this distortion tends to increase as one moves up a supply chain, this is known as “Bullwhip Effect”.
The Bullwhip phenomenon has recognized in many diverse markets. Procter & Gamble found that
the diaper orders issued by the distributors have a degree of variability that cannot be explained by
consumer demand fluctuations (Lee, Padamanabhan and Wang 1997a). Lee, Padamanabhan and
Wang (1997a, b) developed a framework for explaining this phenomenon. Lee, So, and Tang (2000)
showed that, within the context of a two-level supply chain consisting of single manufacturer and
single retailer with AR(1) end demand, the manufacturer would benefit when the retailer shared
its demand information. This paper considers the effect of partial information sharing, within the
framework of Lee, So and Tang, in one manufacturer and n retailers model, focusing on the variance
of the manufacturer’s “demand” (the retailers’ order quantity).
JEL Classification Numbers: C61, M11.
Keywords: Supply Chain Management, Information Sharing, Inventory.
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1 Introduction
The term supply chain refers to a system consisting of material suppliers, production facilities, dis-
tribution services, and customers who are all linked together via the downstream flow of materials
(deliveries) and the upstream feedback flow of orders (Stevens 1989; Disney and Towill 2003). In many
supply chains, the variance of orders may be considerably larger than the variance of sales, and this
distortion tends to increase as one moves upstream, this is so-called “Bullwhip Effect”. The Bullwhip
phenomenon has recognized in many diverse markets. Procter & Gamble found that the diaper orders
issued by the distributors have a degree of variability that cannot be explained by consumer demand
fluctuations (Lee, Padamanabhan and Wang 1997a). This phenomenon was extensively analyzed by
Lee, Padamanabhan and Wang (1997a, b), which have pointed out five fundamental causes, demand
signal processing (information sharing), order batching, rational game, price variations and long lead
time. Thus, the members in a supply chain have been facing such a phenomenon that causes the
increasing of the average inventory and the total expected cost. In order to avoid the bullwhip effect,
we should eliminate or decrease those causes.
To share the information, however, how should the members of a supply chain do? In practice,
each company’s information system should support both proprietary and shared data. Since it is
needed to manage the company, the proprietary data would be accessible only those employees who
have legitimate internal business needs. The shared data should be available through appropriate
information interfaces to customers, logistics suppliers, or any other party having a need to know,
through a contract or a standard to which all parties agree (Coyle, Bardi and Langley 1996; Stefansson
2002). Advances in Information Technology made it possible to process information at different
locations in the supply chain and thus enabled the application of advanced planning. Cheap and large
storage devices allow to store and retrieve historical mass data, like past sales (Stadlter and Kilger
2002). Stefansson (2002) showed in the case studies that, both small- and medium-sized enterprises in
transportation and production companies do not have basic information systems to implement some
kind of advanced communication system; they communicate only by phone and fax. For the small-
and medium-sized enterprises, they use Internet to communicate with each other, since they cannot
afford for the EDI – Electronic data interchange (Jonsson 1998; Stefansson 2002).
Lee, So, and Tang (2000), hereafter referred to as LST, showed that, within the context of a two-
level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer a retailer with an AR(1) end demand, the manufacturer
would experience great savings when the retailer shares its demand information. For the reason that it
is complex to analyze the value of information sharing analytically for the case when the manufacturer
utilizes historical order quantities to estimate the actual demand, LST did not utilize the retailer’s
historical order to infer the actual value of demand.
Yu, Yan and Cheng (2002) also showed that increasing information sharing among the members in
a decentralized supply chain will lead to Pareto improvement in the performance of the entire chain.
Specifically, the manufacturer can obtain benefits in terms of reductions in inventory levels and cost
saving.
Recenty, Raghunathan and Yeh (2001) extended the LST’s model to the n-retailer’s model by
using continuous replenishment program (CRP) – retailers share their real-time inventory data with
the manufacturer and the manufacturer continuously replenishes inventory of each participant retailer
by his/her own decision. They showed that the CRP can reduce the expected inventory holding costs
of both the manufacturer and the retailer participants.
Raghunathan (2003) also performed the similar analyses, based on Raghunathan and Yeh (2001),
to study the effect of information sharing. Using Shapley value concept from game theory to analyze
the expected manufacturer and retailer shares of the surplus generated from information sharing, to
find out the optimal number of the retailers in such a partnership. Raghunathan assumed that the
replenishment lead times are zero and that the retailers are identical with respect to demand variances
and correlation.
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This paper is also based on the LST’s model and considers the general case of the one-manufacturer
and multi-retailer’s model. This paper differs from those of previous studies such as in Raghunathan
and Yeh (2001) and Raghunathan (2003) since, stressing on the variance of the manufacturer’s “de-
mand” (the retailers’ order quantity) in the situation where (1) the replenishment lead times exist,
(2) the retailers are non identical and (3) their demands are correlated, we obtain the results in var-
ious cases (without information sharing, with partial information sharing, and with full information
sharing).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we shall briefly review only a part of
LST’s work which will be needed in the following. In Section 3, based on the LST model, we investigate
the effect of partial information sharing in a general case – the n-retailer’s model. In Section 4, we
shall show the numerical examples of the special case of n = 3. The concluding remark is given at the
final section.
2 LST Model
We shall briefly review the LST’s model which includes a two-level supply chain consisting of one
retailer and one manufacturer. External demand for a single item occurs at the retailer, where the
underlying demand process faced by the retailer, is a simple auto correlated AR(1) process.
LST consider a periodic review system in which each site reviews its inventory level and replenishes
its inventory from the upstream site every period, and assume that the replenishment lead time L from
the external supplier to the manufacturer and l from the manufacturer to the retailer are constant.
LST describe the ordering process as follows. First, before the end of time period t, t = 1, 2, 3, . . .,
after demand Dt has been realized, the retailer observes the inventory level and places an order of
size Yt with the manufacturer to replenish his/her inventory. It is assumed that there is no time lag
during the order is placed. The retailer will receive the shipment of his/her order at the beginning of
time period t+ l + 1. Excess demand is backlogged.
Second, at the end of time period t, the manufacturer receives and ships the required order quantity
Yt to the retailer. If the manufacturer does not have enough stock to fill this order, then it is assumed
that the manufacturer will meet the shortfall by obtaining some units from an “alternative” source
with additional cost which is considered as the penalty cost to this shortfall. LST consider the case in
which the manufacturer is solely responsible for the penalty cost and for resupplying this alternative
source. Thus, the inventory system at the manufacturer resembles a system with back orders and the
manufacturer guarantees supply to the retailer.
Third, it is assumed that no fixed order cost is incurred when placing an order, and the unit
inventory holding cost and shortage cost are stationary over time. Let h and p denote the unit holding
and shortage costs per time period for the retailer, respectively. Let H and P be the unit holding
and shortage (or back order) costs per time period at the manufacturer, respectively. The shortage
cost at the manufacturer represents the penalty cost to the manufacturer for obtaining items from the
alternative source.
Last, suppose that the partners expect to operate the business for a long time, both the retailer
and the manufacturer would adopt the order-up-to level policy, which leads to minimize the total
discounted holding and shortage costs over the infinite horizon (Heyman and Sobel 1984).
The notation used by LST is summarized as follows:
t Time period, t = 1, 2, 3, . . .
Dt Demand faced by retailer at time period t.
St Retailer’s order-up-to level for time period t.
Yt Retailer’s order quantity at the end of time period t.
Tt Manufacturer’s order-up-to level for time period.
It Manufacturer’s average (on-hand) inventory level.
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h Unit holding cost per time period for the retailer.
H Unit holding cost per time period for the manufacturer.
p Unit shortage cost per time period for the retailer.
P Unit shortage cost per time period for the manufacturer.
l Replenishment lead time for retailer.
L Replenishment lead time for the manufacturer.
Let Dt be the AR(1) demand process at the retailer, where
Dt = d+ αDt−1 + εt, (2.1)
d > 0, −1 < α < 1, and εt is i.i.d normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2. LST assume
that σ is significantly smaller than d, so that the probability of a negative demand is negligible.
Retailer’s Ordering Decision
At the end of time period t, the retailer orders Yt, where
Yt = Dt + (St − St−1) . (2.2)
Eq. (2.2) describes that, the order quantity Yt is equal to the demand during period t plus the
changes being made in the order-up-to levels. It is possible for Yt to be negative. However, by
assuming that σ is significantly smaller than d, the probability of having Yt < 0 is negligible (Lee,
Padamanabhan and Wang 1997b).
By using the recursive relationship of Dt given in Eq. (2.1), the total demand over the lead time
l can be written by
l+1∑
s=1
Dt+s =
d
1− α
(
l + 1− αγl
)
+ αγlDt +
l+1∑
s=1
γl+1−sεt+s,
where γl =
(
1− αl+1) / (1− α).
Let mt and vt be the conditional expectation and the conditional variance (conditioned on Dt) of
the total demand over the lead time l, respectively, where
mt =
d
1− α
(
l + 1− αγl
)
+ αγlDt, (2.3)
vt = σ2
l+1∑
s=1
(
γl+1−s
)2
. (2.4)
Thus, the retailer’s order-up-to level St is given as
St = mt + k∗
√
vt, (2.5)
where k∗ = Φ−1 [p/(p+ h)] for the standard normal distribution function Φ. From Eq. (2.2) and the
above expression for St, the retailer’s order quantity Yt can be written as:
Yt = Dt + αγl (Dt −Dt−1) . (2.6)
Yu et al. (2002) show that V (Yt) ≥ V (Dt) for any 0 ≤ α < 1. This indicates that the Bullwhip
Effect occurs while the auto correlation coefficient 0 ≤ α < 1. Thus, in what follows we assume that
0 ≤ α < 1 to study the value of information sharing, when examining the manufacturer ordering
process.
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Manufacturer’s Ordering Decision
It is assumed that the manufacturer is aware of the fact that the demand process Dt is followed an
AR(1) process with known parameter d, ρ, and σ. This assumption is reasonable, as such information
about the underlying demand process can be communicated to the manufacturer through periodic
discussion with the retailer, or the manufacturer can be provided with historic demand data from
which such inventory can be readily deduced with sufficient accuracy.1 After the manufacturer receives
and ships the retailer’s order Yt at the end of time period t, the manufacturer immediately places an
order with his/her supplier at the end of time period t so as to bring his/her inventory position to an
order-up-to level Tt. This order will arrive at the beginning of time period t + L + 1 to be ready for
the retailer’s order placed at the end of time period t+ L+ 1.
In order to determine his/her order-up-to level Tt, the manufacturer needs to anticipate his/her
total “demand” (shipment quantity) over the manufacturer’s lead time L. Since the manufacturer’s
“demand” corresponds to the retailer’s order quantity, the total shipment quantity over the manufac-
turer’s lead time L, denoted by Bt, is equal to the total orders placed by the retailer over the time
period t+ 1, . . . , t+ L+ 1.
From Eqs. (2.1) and (2.6), it follows that
Yt+1 = d+ αYt + γl+1εt+1 − αγlεt. (2.7)
By repeating Eq. (2.7) above, Yt+s can be derived as
Yt+s = γs−1d+ αsYt + γl+1εt+s + αl+1
k=s−1∑
k=1
αs−kεt+k − αsγlεt. (2.8)
The total shipment quantity over the manufacturer’s lead time L for any given Yt is given as
Bt =
L+1∑
s=1
Yt+s =
d
1− α
(
L+ 1− αγL)+ αγLYt − αγL+lεt + L+1∑
s=1
γL+l+2−sεt+s. (2.9)
To determine the manufacturer’s order-up-to level Tt that minimizes the total expected inventory
holding and shortage costs in period t+ L+ 1, the manufacturer needs to find the distribution of Bt.
Based on difference in information sharing and ordering, the information sharing-based relationship
between the retailer and the manufacturer can be derived to two cases.
When there is no information sharing, the manufacturer receives only information about the re-
tailer’s order quantity Yt. In this case, the error term εt has already been realized, but is unknown to
the manufacturer when he determines his/her order-up-to level Tt at the end of period t. Thus, under
such ideal situation, the manufacturer can obtain the conditional expectation conditioned on Yt over
the manufacturer’s lead time L as:
Mt = E (Bt |Yt ) = d1− α
(
L+ 1− αγL)+ αγLYt, (2.10)
and the conditional variance conditioned on Yt, as
Vt = V ar (Bt |Yt ) = σ2
L+1∑
s=1
(
γL+l+2−s
)2
+
(
αγL+l
)2
σ2. (2.11)
Thus, the manufacturer’s optimal order-up-to level Tt under the case of no information sharing is,
Tt =Mt +K∗
√
Vt, (2.12)
1See Lee et al. 2000.
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with K∗ = Φ−1 [P/(P +H)] for the standard normal distribution function Φ.
With information about customer’s demand in period t, the manufacturer now knows both the
retailer’s order quantity Yt and the error term εt (through the sharing of information about Dt) when
he determines the order-up-to level Tt at the end of the time period t . Thus, the manufacturer can
obtain the conditional expectation and the conditional variance conditioned on Yt and εt over the
manufacturer’s lead time L, respectively, as:
M ′t = E (Bt |Yt, εt ) =
d
1− α
(
L+ 1− αγL)+ αγLYt − αγL+lεt, (2.13)
V ′t = V ar (Bt |Yt, εt ) =
L+1∑
s=1
(
γL+l+2−s
)2
σ2. (2.14)
Thus, the optimal order-up-to level T ′t in the case of information sharing is
T ′t =M
′
t +K
∗
√
V ′t . (2.15)
Observe that Vt and V ′t are independent of t and are increasing in l, L, α for any α ≥ 0. In
addition, note from Eqs. (2.11) and (2.14) that Vt ≥ V ′t . Thus, information sharing would reduce the
variance of the total shipment quantity over the manufacturer’s lead time.
The approximate manufacturer average on-hand inventory in the case when there is information
sharing and there is no information sharing, can be given respectively as follows:
It =
d
2 (1− ρ) +K
∗√Vt,
I ′t =
d
2 (1− ρ) +K
∗
√
V ′t .
From the two expressions above, the manufacturer’s average inventory when there is no information
sharing is larger than that when there is information sharing, i.e.,
It ≥ I ′t. (2.16)
3 Single Manufacturer and n-Retailer Model
In this section, we consider a two-level supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and n retailers.
As in Section 2, the external demand for a single item which occurs at each retailer is assumed to be
a simple AR(1) demand process. Let Di,t be the retailer i’s demand for period t
Di,t = di + αDi,t−1 + εi,t, for any i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (3.1)
We assume that −1 < α < 1 and that, for any i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) di > 0 and σi is significantly
smaller than di. For a given t, the random element of demand at all retailers, εt = (εi,t), follow
an n-variate normal distribution with mean vector zero and variance-covariance matrix Σ, which is
assumed to be positive definite. The correlation coefficient between εi,t and εj,t for i 6= j is ρi,j . εi,t
and εi,s are independent where t 6= s.
For the convenience, let k, r = 1, 2, . . . , q, and k′, r′ = (q + 1), (q + 2), . . . , n. In order to calculate
the conditional mean and the conditional covariance conditioned on ε2,t, partition εt and Σ as:2
εt
n×1
=
 ε1,tq×1ε2,t
(n−q)×1
 , Σ
n×n
=
 Σ11q×q Σ12q×(n−q)Σ21
(n−q)×q
Σ22
(n−q)×(n−q)
 ,
2See Johnson and Wichern 1988 for more details.
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where
εt =

ε1,t
...
εq,t
εq+1,t
...
εn,t

, Σ =

ρ1,1σ1σ1 · · · ρ1,qσ1σq ρ1,q+1σ1σq+1 · · · ρ1,nσ1σn
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
ρq,1σqσ1 · · · ρq,qσqσq ρq,q+1σqσq+1 · · · ρq,nσqσn
ρq+1,1σq+1σ1 · · · ρq+1,qσq+1σq ρq+1,q+1σq+1σq+1 · · · ρq+1,nσq+1σn
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
ρn,1σnσ1 · · · ρn,qσnσq ρn,q+1σnσq+1 · · · ρn,nσnσn

,
and ρi,j = 1 for i = j, ρi,j = ρj,i for i 6= j.
The conditional mean conditioned on ε2,t is getting from the form of Σ12Σ−122 .
Σ12Σ−122 =

β1,q+1 β1,q+2 · · · β1,n
β2,q+1 β2,q+2 · · · β2,n
...
...
. . .
...
βq,q+1 βq,q+2 · · · βq,n
 ,
where βr,r′ = 1/|Σ22|
n∑
k′=q+1
ρr,k′σrσk′Ar′,k′ , and Ar′,k′ is the cofactor of ρr′,k′σr′σk′ of matrix Σ22.
Thus, the conditional mean conditioned on ε2,t is of the form:
E
εk,t
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
k′=q+1
εk′,t
 = n∑
k′=q+1
βk,k′εk′,t. (3.2)
Moreover, the conditional covariance conditioned on ε2,t is
Σ11 −Σ12Σ−122 Σ21 =

c1,1 c1,2 · · · c1,q
c2,1 c2,2 · · · c2,q
...
...
. . .
...
cq,1 cq,2 · · · cq,q
 , (3.3)
where ck,r = ρk,rσkσr −
n∑
k′=q+1
βk,k′ρk′,rσk′σr.
Note that each retailer’s ordering decision is the same as in the previous section. As mentioned
earlier, when we study the manufacturer ordering process we consider only the case which 0 ≤ α < 1.
Manufacturer’s Ordering Decision
As in the previous section, for any i = 1, 2, . . . , n, the manufacturer can deduce the retailer i’s order
quantity on the period t+ 1 as
Yi,t+1 = di + αYi,t + γl+1εi,t+1 − αγlεi,t.
By repeating the above equation, the retailer i’s order quantity on the period t+ s is described as,
Yi,t+s = γs−1di + αsYi.t + γl+1εi,t+s + αl+1
k=s−1∑
k=1
αs−kεi,t+k − αsγlεi,t.
Thus, the retailer i’s total shipment quantity over the manufacturer’s lead time L for any given
Yi,t is
L+1∑
s=1
Yi,t+s =
di
1− α
(
L+ 1− αβL)+ αγLYi,t − αγL+lεi,t + L+1∑
s=1
γL+l+2−sεi,t+s.
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The sum of purchase orders of the n retailers is the aggregate order for the supplier in each period.
As the result, all retailers’ total shipment quantity over the manufacturer’s lead time L can be given
by
Bn,t =
1
1− α
(
L+ 1− αγL) n∑
i=1
di + αγL
n∑
i=1
Yi,t − αγL+l
n∑
i=1
εi,t +
L+1∑
s=1
γL+l+2−s
n∑
i=1
εi,t+s.
According to difference in information sharing and ordering coordination, we formulate the in-
formation sharing-based relationship between the retailers and the manufacturer as three cases: with
partial information sharing, without information sharing, and with full information sharing. The man-
ufacturer needs to find the distribution of Bn,t according to each case in order to determine his/her
inventory order-up-to level Tt which minimizes the total expected inventory holding and shortage costs
in period t+ L+ 1.
The Case of Partial Information Sharing
We assume that only (n− q) retailers share their demand information with the manufacturer and that
the remaining q retailers do not share any information with the manufacturer.
In what follows, with no loss of generality, we assume that the last (n − q) retailers share their
information sharing. Thus, through the sharing of information about
∑n
k′=q+1Dk′,t, the manufacturer
knows the (n− q) retailers’ error term ∑nk′=q+1 εk′,t.
From Eqs. (3.2) and (3.3), the conditional expectation and conditional variance that conditioned
on
∑n
k′=q+1 εk′,t over the manufacturer’s lead-time L can be given, respectively, as
M
(n−q)
n,t = E
(
Bn,t
∣∣∣∑n
k′
εk′,t
)
=Mn,t − αγL+l
 q∑
k=1
n∑
k′=q+1
βk,k′εk′,t +
n∑
k′=q+1
εk′,t
 , (3.4)
V
(n−q)
n,t = V ar
(
Bn,t
∣∣∣∑n
k′
εk′,t
)
= Vn +
(
αγL+l
)2 q∑
k=1
ck,k + 2
(
αγL+l
)2∑∑
k<r
ck,r, (3.5)
where
Mn,t =
1
1− α
(
L+ 1− αγL) n∑
i=1
di + αγL
n∑
i=1
Yi,t,
and
Vn =
L+1∑
s=1
(
γL+l+2−s
)2 n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ρi,jσiσj .
The Case of No Information Sharing
In this case, the manufacturer does not receive any information from the retailers. Thus, the respective
conditional expectation and conditional variance that conditioned on
∑n
i=1 Yi,t over the manufacturer’s
lead-time L are
Mnon,t =Mn,t, (3.6)
V non,t = Vn +
(
αγL+l
)2 n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ρi,jσiσj . (3.7)
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The Case of Full Information Sharing
We assume that all retailers will share their demand information with the manufacturer. Thus, the
conditional expectation and conditional variance over the manufacturer’s lead-time L are
Mfulln,t = E
(
Bn,t
∣∣∣∑n
i
εi,t
)
=Mn,t − αγL+l
n∑
i=1
εi,t, (3.8)
V fulln,t = V ar
(
Bn,t
∣∣∣∑n
i
εi,t
)
= Vn, (3.9)
respectively. We can easily see the following
Proposition 1.
(1) V non,t = V
(n−q)
n,t = V
full
n,t = (L+ 1)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ρi,jσiσj, for α = 0.
(2) When t→∞, E (Mnon,t) = E (M (n−q)n,t ) = E (Mfulln,t ) = L+ 11− α
n∑
i=1
di.
Proof. Obvious.
Proposition 2. Let V (1)n,t and V
(2)
n,t be the conditional variance over the manufacturer’s lead-time L
in case where the last one retailer and the last two retailers respectively share their customer demand
information with the manufacturer. Then
(1) V non,t − V (1)n,t =
(
αγL+l
)2( n∑
i=1
ρi,nσi
)2
≥ 0,
(2) V (1)n,t − V (2)n,t =
(
αγL+l
)2 1
1− ρ2n−1,n
(
n∑
i=1
σi (ρi,n−1 − ρi,nρn−1,n)
)2
≥ 0,
(3) V non,t − V fulln,t =
(
αγL+l
)2 n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ρi,jσiσj ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 1. If all demands across retailers are independent, then
V
(n−q)
n,t − V (n−q+1)n,t =
(
αγL+l
)2
σ2q , for q = 1, 2, . . . , n.
From Silver and Peterson (1985) and LST, the approximate average inventory can be given as,
I =
d
2 (1− α) +K
∗√V ,
and from Proposition 2, we have
V non,t ≥ V (1)n,t ≥ V (2)n,t .
Thus,
Inon,t ≥ I(1)n,t ≥ I(2)n,t . (3.10)
The manufacturer’s average inventory level decreases with an increase of information sharing, and
the manufacturer can obtain a reduction in its inventory level.
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4 Numerical Examples
This section considers the special case of previous section specified on a simple two-level supply chain
consisting one manufacturer and three retailers model in more details. From Eq. (3.5), we have
V no3,t = V3 +
(
αβLβl
)2 (
σ21 + σ
2
2 + σ
2
3 + 2ρ12σ1σ2 + 2ρ13σ1σ3 + 2ρ23σ2σ3
)
, (4.1)
V
(1)
3,t = V3 +
(
αβLβl
)2 [
σ21
(
1− ρ213
)
+ σ22
(
1− ρ223
)
+ 2σ1σ2 (ρ12 − ρ13ρ23)
]
, (4.2)
V
(2)
3,t = V3 +
(
αβLβl
)2 σ21
1− ρ223
(
1 + 2ρ12ρ13ρ23 − ρ212 − ρ213 − ρ223
)
, (4.3)
V full3,t =
L+1∑
s=1
(
βL+l+2−s
)2 (
σ21 + σ
2
2 + σ
2
3 + 2ρ12σ1σ2 + 2ρ13σ1σ3 + 2ρ23σ2σ3
)
, (4.4)
where V3 =
L+1∑
s=1
(
βL+l+2−s
)2 (
σ21 + σ
2
2 + σ
2
3 + 2ρ12σ1σ2 + 2ρ13σ1σ3 + 2ρ23σ2σ3
)
.
From Eqs. (3.5), (3.7), (3.9), and Proposition 1 it follows that
(1) V no3,t − V (1)3,t =
(
αβLβl
)2
(σ3 + ρ13σ1 + ρ23σ2)
2 ,
(2) V (1)3,t − V (2)3,t =
(
αβLβl
)2 1
1− ρ223
[
σ1 (ρ12 − ρ13ρ23) + σ2
(
1− ρ223
)]2
,
(3) V (2)3,t − V full3,t =
(
αβLβl
)2 σ21
1− ρ223
(
1 + 2ρ12ρ13ρ23 − ρ212 − ρ213 − ρ223
)
.
From Eq. (2.16) we have,
I3,t =
∑3
i=1 di
2 (1− α) +K
∗√V3,t. (4.5)
Corollary 1. From the above (1), (2) and (3), we can easily show:
(1) The value of V (p)3,t is decreasing in p, i.e., V
no
3,t ≥ V (1)3,t ≥ V (2)3,t ≥ V full3,t .
(2) For any 0 ≤ ρi,j = ρ < 1 and σ1 ≤ σ2 ≤ σ3 we have, the marginal value of V (p)3,t
is decreasing, i.e.,
(
V no3,t − V (1)3,t
)
≥
(
V
(1)
3,t − V (2)3,t
)
≥
(
V
(2)
3,t − V full3,t
)
.
Corollary 2. For α = 0 we have
V no3,t = V
(1)
3,t = V
(2)
3,t = V
full
3,t = (L+ 1)
(
σ21 + σ
2
2 + σ
2
3 + 2ρ12σ1σ2 + 2ρ13σ1σ3 + 2ρ23σ2σ3
)
.
Proposition 3. From Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, the manufacturer’s optimal order-up-to level is
decreasing with increasing level of information integration, i.e.,
lim
t→∞E
(
Tno3,t
) ≥ lim
t→∞E
(
T
(1)
3,t
)
≥ lim
t→∞E
(
T
(2)
3,t
)
≥ lim
t→∞E
(
T full3,t
)
.
From the previous Corollary 1, and Eq. (4.5) we can deduce the following,
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Proposition 4. The manufacturer’s average inventory level is decreasing with increasing level of
information integration, i.e.,
Ino3,t ≥ I(1)3,t ≥ I(2)3,t ≥ Ifull3,t .
We present some numerical examples to illustrate the manufacturer’s inventory levels, associated
with information sharing as a function of the demand process characteristics σi, α, and ρi,j , based
on Eqs. (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), and (4.5). We exclusively focus on the case where α ≥ 0. For the
convenience, we assume that all retailers are identical. The parameters are set as follows: the demand
process is specified by di = d = 100, and the manufacturer’s cost parameters are given as P = 25,
H = 1.25.
Figure 1: The Impact of α on Average Manufacturer Inventory.
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When analyzing the impact of α, ρ and σ, we set l = 7 and L = 5. In Figures 1 through 5
below, the vertical axis denotes the manufacturer’s (approximate) average inventory which can reflect
production costs, α represents auto correlation coefficient, ρ the correlation coefficient across the
retailers, and σ the standard deviation of each retailer’s demand. Firstly, we examine the impact of
α, by setting σi = σ = 5 and ρi,j = ρ = 0.5 and letting α vary from 0 to 0.9. Figure 1 depicts the
Figure 2: The Impact of ρ on Average Manufacturer Inventory.
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average manufacturer’s inventory when α varies from 0 to 0.9, with all cases of information sharing
pattern. We observe that the average manufacturer’s inventory increases as α increases, and that for
the greater value of α, the graphs increase sharply. And, the impact of information sharing on the
manufacturer’s average inventory is very small when α is smaller (especially, α < 0.5).
In Figure 2, we analyze the impact of ρ, by setting σi = σ = 5, α = 0.7, and varying ρ from 0 to
0.9. It shows that the average manufacturer’s inventory goes up as ρ increases. Note that, when the
value of ρ is going larger the benefit of information sharing can also be obtained greater.
Figure 3: The Impact of σ on Average Manufacturer Inventory.
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In Figure 3, we see the impact of σ, by setting ρi,j = ρ = 0.5, α = 0.7 and varying σ from 0 to 50.
It shows that, the impact of information sharing is significantly great as σ increases.
The last two figures depict the average manufacturer inventory when we set the correlation coeffi-
cient ρ as different value. Figure 4 pictures the average manufacturer inventory by setting ρ12 = 0.3
Figure 4: The Changing of Average Inventory while ρ12 = 0.3 and ρ13 = 0.6.
300
320
340
360
380
400
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9ρ
23
Av
era
ge
 In
ve
nt
ory
No Information Sharing
One Information Sharing
Two Information Sharing
Full Information Sharing
and ρ13 = 0.6 with the variation of ρ23 from 0 to 0.9. Figure 5 depicts the average manufacturer
inventory by setting ρ12 = 0.6 and ρ13 = 0.3 and ρ23 is varied from 0 to 0.9. Note that, the value of
ρ23 must not be larger than 0.9432 to satisfy the positive definite of Σ. In Figures 4 and 5, graphs do
not change except for the case of “one information sharing”. We can see that, as ρ23 increases, the
value of information sharing increases.
12
Figure 5: The Changing of Average Inventory while ρ12 = 0.6 and ρ13 = 0.3.
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5 Concluding Remark
This paper attempts to quantify the benefits of information sharing. By assuming that the external
demand for the retailers is autocorrelated AR(1), our analytical study and numerical examples show
that when demand information is shared, the manufacturer can obtain average inventory reduction.
Moreover, our results suggest that, the manufacturer may get the larger reduction (in terms of average
inventory level), in case where the autocorrelation coefficient and correlation coefficient between the
retailers are higher, and the replenishment lead time is longer. Also this paper mainly analyzes the
manufacturer’s ordering process which leads to obtain more considerable improvement in performance,
and there is no change in the retailers inventory level. Therefore, the manufacturer should make some
concessions instead, such as reducing the retailer replenishment lead time, in order to encourage
retailers to share their customers’ demand information.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.
When q = n− 1 then k′ = n therefore, |Σ22| = σ2n and An,n = 1. It follows that,
βk,k′ = βk,n =
1
|Σ22|
n∑
k
ρk,nσkσnAn,n =
1
|Σ22|ρk,nσkσnAn,n =
1
σ2n
ρk,nσkσn.
Thus,
V
(1)
n,t = Vn +
(
αγL+l
)2 [n−1∑
k=1
(
σ2k − βk,nρk,nσkσn
)
+ 2
n−1∑∑
k<r
(
ρk,rσkσr − βk,nρr,nσrσn
)]
= Vn +
(
αγL+l
)2 [n−1∑
k=1
(
σ2k − ρ2k,nσ2k
)
+ 2
n−1∑∑
k<r
(
ρk,rσkσr − ρk,nρr,nσkσr
)]
.
When q = n− 2 then k′ = {n− 1, n}. Thus, |Σ22| = σ2n−1σ2n
(
1− ρ2n−1,n
)
and An−1,n−1 = σ2n, An,n = σ
2
n−1, An−1,n =
−ρn−1,nσn−1σn and
βk,n−1 =
σk
σ2n−1
(
1− ρ2n−1,n
)(ρk,n−1σn−1 − ρk,nρn−1,nσn−1),
βk,n =
σk
σ2n
(
1− ρ2n−1,n
)(ρk,nσn − ρk,n−1ρn−1,nσn).
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Therefore, we have
V
(2)
n,t = Vn +
(
αγL+l
)2 [n−2∑
k=1
(
σ2k − βk,n−1ρk,n−1σkσn−1 − βk,nρk,nσkσn
)
+ 2
n−2∑∑
k<r
(
ρk,rσkσr − βk,n−1ρr,n−1σrσn−1 − βk,nρr,nσrσn
)]
= Vn +
(
αγL+l
)2 [n−2∑
k=1
(
σ2k − σ
2
k
1− ρ2n−1,n
(
ρ2k,n−1 + ρ
2
k,n − 2ρk,n−1ρk,nρn−1,n
))
+ 2
n−2∑∑
k<r
(
ρk,rσkσr − σkσr
1− ρ2n−1,n
(
ρk,n−1ρr,n−1 + ρk,nρr,n − ρr,n−1ρk,nρn−1,n − ρk,n−1ρr,nρn−1,n
))]
.
(1):
V non,t − V (1)n,t =
(
αγL+l
)2( n∑
k=1
σ2k + 2
n∑∑
k<r
ρk,rσkσr −
n−1∑
k=1
σ2k +
n−1∑
k=1
ρ2k,nσ
2
k − 2
n−1∑∑
k<r
ρk,rσkσr
+ 2
n−1∑∑
k<r
ρk,nσkρr,nσr
)
=
(
αγL+l
)2(
σ2n + 2
n−1∑
k=1
ρk,nσkσn +
n−1∑
k=1
ρ2k,nσ
2
k + 2
n−1∑∑
k<r
ρk,nσkρr,nσr
)
=
(
αγL+l
)2(
σn +
n−1∑
k=1
ρk,nσk
)2
=
(
αγL+l
)2( n∑
k=1
ρk,nσk
)2
≥ 0.
(2):
V
(1)
n,t − V (2)n,t =
[n−1∑
k=1
(
σ2k − ρ2k,nσ2k
)
+ 2
n−1∑∑
k<r
(
ρk,rσkσr − ρk,nhor,nσkσr
)]
−
n−2∑
k=1
σ2k
[
1− 1
1− ρ2n−1,n
(
ρ2k,n−1 + ρ
2
k,n
− 2ρk,n−1ρk,nρn−1,n
)]
− 2
n−2∑∑
k<r
σkσr
[
ρk,r − 1
1− ρ2n−1,n
(
ρk,n−1ρr,n−1 + ρk,nρr,n
− ρr,n−1ρk,nρn−1,n − ρk,n−1ρr,nρn−1,n
)]
.
Let
A =
n−1∑
k=1
σ2k
(
1− ρ2k,n
)
+ 2
n−1∑∑
k<r
ρk,rσkσr − 2
n−1∑∑
k<r
ρk,nσkρr,nσr −
n−2∑
k=1
σ2k − 2
n−2∑∑
k<r
ρk,rσkσr
= σ2n−1 −
n−1∑
k=1
(
ρk,nσk
)2
+
(
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
r=1
ρk,rσkσr −
n−1∑
k=1
σ2k
)
−
[
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
r=1
ρk,nσkρr,nσr −
n−1∑
k=1
(
ρk,nσk
)2]
−
(
n−2∑
k=1
n−2∑
r=1
ρk,rσkσr −
n−2∑
k=1
σ2k
)
= 2σn−1
n−1∑
r=1
ρr,n−1σr − σ2n−1 −
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
r=1
ρk,nσkρr,nσr,
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and let
B =
1
1− ρ2n−1,n
[n−2∑
k=1
σ2k
(
ρ2k,n−1 + ρ
2
k,n − 2ρk,n−1ρk,nρn−1,n
)
+ 2
n−2∑∑
k<r
σkσr
(
ρk,n−1ρr,n−1 + ρk,nρr,n
− ρr,n−1ρk,nρn−1,n − ρk,n−1ρr,nρn−1,n
)]
=
1
1− ρ2n−1,n
[
n−2∑
k=1
σ2k
(
ρ2k,n−1 + ρ
2
k,n − 2ρk,n−1ρk,nρn−1,n
)− n−2∑
k=1
σ2k
(
ρ2k,n−1 − 2ρk,n−1ρk,nρn−1,n + ρ2k,n
)
+
n−2∑
k=1
n−2∑
r=1
σkσr
(
ρk,n−1ρr,n−1 + ρk,nρr,n − ρr,n−1ρk,nρn−1,n − ρk,n−1ρr,nρn−1,n
)]
=
1
1− ρ2n−1,n
(
n−2∑
k=1
n−2∑
r=1
ρk,n−1σkρr,n−1σr +
n−2∑
k=1
n−2∑
r=1
ρk,nσkρr,nσr − ρn−1,n
n−2∑
k=1
n−2∑
r=1
ρk,nσkρr,n−1σr
− ρn−1,n
n−2∑
k=1
n−2∑
r=1
ρk,n−1σkρr,nσr
)
.
Thus,
V
(1)
n,t − V (2)n,t =
=
1
1− ρ2n−1,n
{
2σn−1
n−1∑
r=1
ρr,n−1σr − σ2n−1 −
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
r=1
ρk,nσkρr,nσr − 2ρ2n−1,nσn−1
n−1∑
r=1
ρr,n−1σr + ρ
2
n−1,nσ
2
n−1
+ ρ2n−1,n
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
r=1
ρk,nσkρr,nσr +
n−2∑
k=1
n−2∑
r=1
ρk,n−1σkρr,n−1σr +
n−2∑
k=1
n−2∑
r=1
ρk,nσkρr,nσr − ρn−1,n
n−2∑
k=1
n−2∑
r=1
ρk,nσkρr,n−1σr
− ρn−1,n
n−2∑
k=1
n−2∑
r=1
ρk,n−1σkρr,nσr
}
=
1
1− ρ2n−1,n
{
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
r=1
ρk,n−1σkρr,n−1σr − 2ρn−1,nσn−1
n−1∑
r=1
ρr,nσr + ρ
2
n−1,nσ
2
n−1 − 2ρ2n−1,nσn−1
n−1∑
r=1
ρr,n−1σr
+ ρ2n−1,nσ
2
n−1 + ρ
2
n−1,n
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
r=1
ρk,nσkρr,nσrρn−1,n
n−2∑
k=1
n−2∑
r=1
ρk,nσkρr,n−1σr − ρn−1,n
n−2∑
k=1
n−2∑
r=1
ρk,n−1σkρr,nσr
}
=
1
1− ρ2n−1,n
{
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
r=1
ρk,n−1σkρr,n−1σr − 2ρn−1,nσn−1
n−1∑
r=1
ρr,nσr − ρn−1,n
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
r=1
ρk,nσkρr,n−1σr + ρ
2
n−1,nσ
2
n−1
+ ρ2n−1,n
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
r=1
ρk,nσkρr,nσr − ρn−1,n
n−2∑
k=1
n−2∑
r=1
ρk,n−1σkρr,nσr
}
=
1
1− ρ2n−1,n
{
−ρn−1,n
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
r=1
ρk,nσkρr,n−1σr + ρ
2
n−1,n
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
r=1
ρk,nσkρr,nσr +
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
r=1
ρk,n−1σkρr,nσr
− ρn−1,n
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
r=1
ρk,n−1σkρr,nσr
}
=
1
1− ρ2n−1,n

(
n−1∑
k=1
ρk,n−1σk
)2
+
(
ρn−1,n
n−1∑
k=1
ρk,nσk
)2
− 2ρn−1,n
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
k=1
(
ρk,nσk
)(
ρk,n−1σk
)
=
1
1− ρ2n−1,n
(
n−1∑
k=1
σk
(
ρk,n−1 − ρk,nρn−1,n
))2
=
1
1− ρ2n−1,n
(
n∑
k=1
σk
(
ρk,n−1 − ρk,nρn−1,n
))2
≥ 0.
(3): Since Σ is positive definite,
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ρi,jσiσj > 0 .
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